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means as the antilog of the logarithmic mean, 
since he has automatically converted all data 
tologarithms a t  the beginning. These then are 
geometric, not arithmetic means. 
The major criticism of this work concerns 
the sample sizes employed. One basic require- 
ment of multivariate statistics such as DL is 
for adequate samples, specifically ones that 
exceed the number of input variables. The 
entirety of the 13 Sulawesi samples fall below 
this norm: 7 of the n’s are smaller than lo!  
Furthermore, 16 of the 28 non-Sulawesi sam- 
ples number less than 10. In fact, 17% of all 
the samples are of 3 or less specimens. The 
makeshift quality of these data just does not 
justify monographic treatment, and this slim 
volume’s price is completely beyond reason. 
Albrecht should have pared down the in- 
troductory sections (the historical overview is 
typical thesis padding and not necessary to 
the published version), eliminated the copious 
raw data and univariate graphs (copies could 
be supplied on request to the few workers in- 
terested in them), and then submitted the re- 
maining medium-sized article to AJPA so we 
could all get it  for free. 
ROBERT S. CORRUCCINI 
Carbondale, Illinois 
DIE FOSSILGESCHICHTE D S MENSCHEN. By 
Wilhelm Gieseler. Gustav Fischer Verlag, 
Stuttgart. 1974. ix-357 pp., figures, tables, 
bibliography, index. DM 36. - (paper). 
The pace of the discovery of hominid fossils 
has increased to such an  extent that  any book 
that attempts to summarize the human fossil 
record will inevitably be out of date by the 
time it appears in print, In the case of the book 
by the late Wilhelm Gieseler of Tubingen the 
publication date was 1974 and only a few 
sources as recent as 1972 are mentioned. In ef- 
fect, then, the book is really an attempt to 
present the state of the art as of 1971. In fact, 
however, this is actually the third revision- 
now separately published for the first time- 
of the identically titled section that Gieseler 
originally wrote for Gerhard Heberer’s Die 
Evolution der Organismen in 1943. If the re- 
portage of the fossil record was more than a 
bit behind the times a t  the date of publication, 
the views that  condition the descriptions and 
interpretations are even more a reflection of 
the intellectual past. The interpretive models 
most often credited are those of the French an- 
thropologist Henri-Victor Vallois and the late 
Gottingen scholar Gerhard Heberer. During 
his life, Heberer had observed that his prin- 
cipal intellectual inspiration in approaching 
the hominid fossil record had been provided by 
Marcellin Boule in the first edition of Les 
Hommes Fossiles (1921). Vallois, of course, 
revised this work after Boule’s death for its 
final edition but the views remained substan- 
tially the same. Gieseler, then in following the 
approaches of Vallois and Heberer, is actual- 
ly reflecting the orientation established by 
Boule more than fifty years ago. 
Even the order in which the chapters are 
presented is essentially the same as in Boule’s 
classic work. The history of European discov- 
eries is followed by accounts of European 
geology and European Paleolithic archae- 
ology. European fossil hominids are then 
treated-Neanderthal, “Praneandertaler,” 
“Prasapiens,” Upper then Lower Pleistocene 
specimens from Europe and the Near East. 
The latter part of the book is then devoted to 
finds from Asia and finally, Africa, and the 
farther from Europe i t  strays, the more per- 
functory and out-of-date i t  becomes. 
In keeping with the model on which i t  is so 
clearly based, the book is almost entirely 
silent concerning the processes of evolution. 
Mutation and selection are mentioned just 
once and only for the purpose of denying that 
there is any point in discussing their possible 
role in altering Neanderthal form in a modern 
direction. True to the paradigm of what we 
might call “Boulean logic,” Neanderthals are 
considered specifically distinct from sapiens. 
They are portrayed as a peculiar and special- 
ized form that became extinct without giving 
rise to any descendants. What is meant by 
“specialized” is not stated, although in con- 
text it would appear to mean anything that is 
different in appearance from the modern 
human condition. Adaptation in a Darwinian 
sense is not discussed a t  all, and Darwin’s 
name is mentioned only in association with 
his prediction that Africa should be the most 
likely place to search for hominid origins. 
In sum, the book is a monument to the truth 
of Thomas Kuhn’s observation t h a t  t h e  
paradigms of what had been the normal sci- 
ence of yesteryear do not change with the 
addition of new evidence but only with the 
death of their holders. Heberer and Gieseler 
are no longer living, and it seems highly 
unlikely that any of their successors will pro- 
duce a work that treats the hominid fossil re- 
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cord a t  such length but solely from the per- 
spective of static typology. 
C. LORING BRACE 
University of Michigan 
FIGURING ANTHROPOLOGY: FIRST PRINCIPLES 
OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS. By David 
Hurst Thomas. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
New York. 1976. xi-532 pp., figures, tables, 
examples,  bibliography, index. $13.50 
(cloth). 
When the second edition of this book ap- 
pears, and the astonishingly large number of 
typos and just plain errors are removed (a 
lengthy Errata is furnished but less than half 
the mistakes noted are corrected), this book 
will serve as the basic introduction to proba- 
bility and statistical inference for a genera- 
tion or so of anthropologists. I t  is written to be 
pertinent to all anthropologists, and biologi- 
cally oriented students will find it very useful. 
In combination with Biometry (Sokal and 
Rohlf, 19691, a strong background in statistics 
can be soundly begun. 
Since the book is, by virtue of its coverage, 
excellence in writing style, and presentation 
of numerous examples, bound to be important 
in the training of the next generation of physi- 
cal anthropologists, and since i t  is probably 
pretty common for a physical anthropologist 
to offer an introductory course in statistics in 
many anthropology departments, the book de- 
serves careful consideration. 
Happily, the strongest subject considered is 
that of the normal distribution. Thomas’ 
treatment will be well received by most physi- 
cal anthropologists. Variation is especially 
well covered. The book spends almost 400 
pages on probability theory as a framework for 
understanding discrete random variables, hy- 
pothesis testing, Student’s t, nonparametric 
statistics, correlation and regression, and 
sampling procedures. Since Thomas explicitly 
lists the assumptions of various tests as in- 
cluding randomization, it is difficult for a stu- 
dent to understand why the numerous exam- 
ples Thomas presents are rarely, i f  ever, based 
on random sampling. Contributors to this 
journal, including the reviewer, have pres- 
ented significance levels as if the sample was 
randomly selected. Thomas is aware of this 
difficulty (pp. 446-47) and tries to rationalize 
such usage by visualizing a hypothetical uni- 
verse from which the observed (biased) sample 
could be thought of as being drawn. This is not 
convincing. I think what Thomas means is 
that  alpha levels, even if quite incorrect due to 
sample bias, still serve us well as aids in reach- 
ing a decision. The problem is that  by se- 
lecting an  extremely biased sample, the inves- 
tigator can easily get on the wrong side of the 
null hypothesis, virtually insuring its “rejec- 
tion.” One must feel uncomfortable with 
Thomas’ opinion that “we don’t have as much 
to lose from bending the rules of statistics, 
since most anthropologists probably only half- 
believe their statistics anyway (p. 4471.’’ In 
any case, the editor of this journal should 
seriously consider requiring all statements of 
probability or confidence intervals or point 
estimations which are obtained from non-ran- 
domly selected samples to carry the caveat as 
i f  drawn f rom a random sample in order to re- 
mind us all of the weakness of such state- 
ments. 
Of the numerous errors in the examples, 
problems and formulae, a few are especially 
unfortunate. On p. 351, for example, Model I 
least squares regression (where no error is 
present in the predictor variable) is inap- 
propriately used to demonstrate a study of 
weight vs. mean annual temperature. This 
error is one frequently committed in this jour- 
nal. Yet elsewhere (p. 374) Thomas has an ex- 
cellent discussion of Model I1 regression. But 
unfortunately, he suggests that  either regres- 
sion line, Yon X or X on Y, will serve to predict 
Y, which is not correct. Another example of in- 
ternal inconsistencies lies in an example on p. 
393 where an r of 0.61 with a sample of 7 
did not reach significance a t  the 0.01 level, 
whereas Thomas incorrectly suggests that  
“almost surely” the results would have been 
significant with a larger sample. Yet on p. 464 
he correctly points out the frequent misun- 
derstanding of the relationship between n and 
p (a larger sample should just as likely pro- 
duce a larger as a smaller probability value. 
with unbiased samples). The common intui- 
tive misunderstanding of statistical inference 
is not helped by such an uneven treatment. 
Other minor misuses occur. Thomas suggests 
that  Spearman’s Rho can only be compared 
with parametric r “through tortuous analogy” 
while in fact any Pearson r formula applied to 
ranked data will give the same numerical re- 
sult as the shortcut computing formula of 
Spearman’s Rho (which takes advantage of 
